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Abstract
This study compares the behavior of students and non-students in a number of
classic experimental games. We ￿nd that students are more likely to behave as homo-
economicus agents than non-students in games involving other-regarding preferences
(Dictator Game, Trust Game and Public Good Game). These di￿erences persist even
when controlling for demographics, cognitive ability and risk preferences. In games
that do not engage other-regarding preferences (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auc-
tion) there is limited evidence of di￿erences in behaviour between subject pools. In
none of the ￿ve games is there evidence of signi￿cant di￿erences in comprehension
between students and non-students. Within subject analyses indicate that students
are highly consistent in their other-regarding preferences while non-student subjects
are inconsistent across other-regarding games. Our ￿ndings suggest that experiments
using students will provide a lower bound estimate of other-regardedness in the general
population while exaggerating the stability of other-regarding preferences.
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11 Introduction
Are students so di￿erent? Most subject pools in experiments conducted in social sciences
are drawn from undergraduate student populations (Morton and Williams, 2009; Peterson,
2001). Based on a survey of 60 laboratory experimental economics papers published in
major experimental economic journals, Danielson and Holm (2007) found that only four
did not use students as subjects. Reliance on student subject pools is a potential concern
because some recent studies suggest systematic di￿erences in the experimental behaviour of
students versus non-student subjects (Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005; Carpenter,
Connolly and Myers, 2008). A comprehensive second-order meta-analysis of social science
experiments conducted by Peterson (2001) suggests that student samples tend to be much
more homogeneous than non-student samples and that the treatment e￿ect sizes di￿er
signi￿cantly across these two types of samples.1
How does the behaviour of students and non-students di￿er? There are two stylized facts
that emerge from experimental work comparing student and non-student subject pools.
First, students are more likely than non-students to resemble the homo economicus in
other-regarding games. Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2005) compares students and
workers in both a laboratory and ￿eld setting and ￿nds that workers were more generous in
the Dictator Game while students made more generous o￿ers in the Ultimatum Game. A
comparison of contributions of students versus community members in a charitable dona-
tion version of the Dictator Game found that students were much less generous (Carpenter,
Connolly and Myers, 2008).
Second, in experiments with more complex game forms, that do not engage other-regarding
preferences, there is less evidence of di￿erences in equilibrium play between student and
non-student subject pools. A classic study is the comparison of newspaper and lab Beauty-
contest experiments (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002) which concludes that the lab and ￿eld
generate comparable results. Depositario et al. (2009) ￿nd no di￿erence in the bidding
behaviour of students and non-students in a uniform price auction.
1There is, though, some limited evidence that the experimental behaviour of student and non-student
subject pools is similar (Ball and Chech, 1996; Egas and Riedl, 2008).
2Hence there is evidence that the behaviour of student and non-student subject pools di￿er.
And casual observation suggests that these subject pool di￿erences might vary according to
the type of experiments concerned. We have implemented a set of experiments designed to
calibrate the overall magnitude of these subject pool di￿erences and to assess whether, and
how, these di￿erences vary across types of games. The design allows us not only to explore
whether game type conditions subject pool di￿erences in homo-economicus behaviour but
also whether a number of other factors might help to explain these di￿erences.
We assess, and explain, subject pool e￿ects by comparing systematic di￿erences in equilib-
rium play between students and non-students. Deviation from equilibrium play of course
has been widely observed in lab experiments (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). Our experiments
compare equilibrium play across a range of experiments, employing a within-subject de-
sign. The results con￿rm that these deviations are large. But of particular interest here is
that the magnitudes of these deviations vary substantially across student and non-student
subject pools.
We test ￿ve possible explanations for these subject pool di￿erences: demographic compo-
sition; risk preferences, other-regarding preferences; cognitive abilities; and design e￿ects.
An obvious point of departure for explaining student versus non-student di￿erences in
equilibrium play is simply the demographic composition of the subject-pools. The subject
pools are in fact quite distinct on demographic characteristics that one might expect to af-
fect behaviour (gender, intelligence, and age). But we ￿nd that these covariates contribute
little to our understanding of subject pool di￿erences in equilibrium choices. Moreover, in
some cases the distinctiveness of the covariate distributions across subject pools suggests
that controlling on these variables in multi-variate analyses of lab experiment data is an
inappropriate strategy for addressing subject pool di￿erences.
Risk aversion varies signi￿cantly within both subject pools. Approximately a third of our
respondents exhibited inconsistent responses on the risk aversion measure which limited
the analyses incorporating this variable. With that caveat in mind, we ￿nd no evidence
that subject pool di￿erences can be explained by di￿erences in risk aversion.
By varying the types of experimental games that each subject plays, we explore whether
3variations in preferences or cognitive skills across subject pools might result in di￿erential
equilibrium behaviour. The subjects all play the identical ￿ve games; some of which are pri-
marily other-regarding (Trust Game, Dicator Game, and Public Goods Game) and others
which have game forms that are strategically challenging (Beauty-contest and Second-price
Auction). Hence we can observe the behaviour of the same subjects over very di￿erent
types of games. Our results suggest that di￿erences in other-regarding preferences most
certainly account for the signi￿cantly higher levels of equilibrium behaviour by students
in games that engage other-regarding preferences. The fact that the di￿erences across
other-regarding games are most dramatic for the simplest of games (the Dictator Game)
would seem to rule out other explanations such as comprehension.
The within subject design allows us to explore whether decisions are consistently other-
regarding (or consistently non-other-regarding). Across other-regarding games, student
choices exhibit high levels of consistent homo-economicus preferences. On the other hand,
while non-students are highly generous in other-regarding games, their choices suggest
much more inconsistent preferences.
Our experiments provide little evidence that variations in equilibrium behaviour can be
accounted for by di￿erential levels of strategic reasoning abilities (or cognitive skills) in
student versus non-student subject pools. Levels of non-equilibrium choice are much lower
in the case of our two games with strategically challenging game forms. At the same time,
though, we ￿nd much weaker evidence of student versus non-student di￿erences in levels
of non-equilibrium behaviour in these strategic reasoning games. If strategic reasoning
abilities were an explanation here we would expect large di￿erences across student/non-
student subject pools or across education and IQ groupings but this was not the case.
Hence, comprehension of the game form is a much more likely explanation for the non-
equilibrium choices that are made in our two games with strategically challenging game
forms.
Accordingly we explore whether design e￿ects explain non-equilibrium behaviour in our
￿ve experiments. Some subject types may simply not understand the game form of the
experiment. Or there might be features of the experimental context that confound the
treatment e￿ects. "House money e￿ects" or the contrived and abstract nature of the lab
environment might trigger non-equilibrium behaviour. And if in fact these design e￿ects
4are important, we would expect them to be more salient for non-student as opposed to
student subjects. For example, non-students might be more sensitive to "house money
e￿ects" associated with monetary incentives; or students might perform better in cogni-
tively challenging experiments because they have a better understanding of the game form
(Chou et al., 2009).
We implement two treatments in order to test for design e￿ects. First, we conduct a re-
peated public goods game and ￿nd that learning (which one might expect would reduce
di￿erential comprehension rates) does not signi￿cantly reduce the di￿erences in equilib-
rium behaviour by the two subject pools. Second, we implement a non-obtrusive test of
cooperative behaviour that takes place outside of the, potentially contrived and abstract,
lab environment. Again, di￿erences in other-regarding behaviour persist between subject
pools. Hence, neither result suggests that our subject pool di￿erences are an artifact of
the experimental design.
2 Experimental design
To explore these issues we exploited the opening of the new lab at the Nu￿eld Centre
for Experimental Social Sciences in Oxford. This was the ￿rst experiment carried out in
the lab. Hence, the subjects have not yet been exposed to experiments carried out in
the lab. Accordingly, past participation in CESS lab experiments or information about
CESS experiments cannot explain outcomes in this experiment. Subjects may have a prior
about experiments based on past experiences or information they have about experiments
in social sciences. But, because the lab is new, it does not have a reputation and hence
subjects cannot know, even through their peers, what types of experiments are carried
out in this lab. Moreover, since we are comparing subject decisions across a number of
classic experimental economic games, we rule out the potential di￿erential e￿ect of previous
experimental participation.
At the time of the experiment, the CESS subject pool consisted of 1,000 students and
non-students: 75 percent are students and 57 percent are females. Half of the students are
freshmen and they come from more than 30 di￿erent disciplines. Half of the non-students
5are private employees and there is also a signi￿cant number of workers, self-employees,
public employees, and unemployed. Student and non-student subjects were told they
could earn on average between ¿10 and ¿15 per hour. The typical gross pay of students
working for Oxford university is ¿12, and the average salary of an administrator in the UK
in 2008 was ¿16,994, which corresponds to an hourly rate of ¿8.5. 2
2.1 Experimental set-up
Table 1 describes the six sessions of the experiment; two with students, two with non-
students and two with a mixed population (a total of 128 subjects). All sessions were
conducted at 5.30 or 6 pm. Each session lasted for about one hour and a half. Upon arrival,
subjects were assigned randomly to a desk in the lab. We read out the instructions. 3 We
presented the experiment as consisting of two parts. The ￿rst part involved 6 di￿erent
situations, which we asked subjects to treat independently of each other. We read the
instructions for the ￿rst situation; subjects were instructed to take a decision after we read
the instructions. We then moved on to the second situation and so on. Subjects received
no feedback about their payo￿s in each of these situations until all six situations were
completed (except in the last situation, which featured a repeated interaction). Earnings
for this part were determined by selecting one of the six situations randomly (subjects were
informed of the payment scheme at the very beginning). The second part of the experiment
was an IQ test consisting of 26 questions. Subjects received ¿0.20 for each correct answer. 4
The situations were presented in the following sequence for all subjects (identi￿ed only by
their number): 1) Trust game (TG), 2) Guessing game (GG), 3) Dictator game (DG), 4)
Second price sealed bid auction, 5) Elicitation of risk preferences, 6) Repeated public good
game.
2Source: http://www.mysalary.co.uk/
3The instructions can be found in appendix B.
4We separated the experiment into two parts because they were fundamentally di￿erent. The ￿rst part,
experimental games, was administered using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and di￿erent situations involved
a combination of one’s own decisions, others’ decisions and chance. The second part, the IQ test, was
administered using a di￿erent program (MS Access) and it did not involve strategic interaction nor chance
moves. In this latter situation, participants’ payo￿s depended only on their knowledge and e￿ort.
6Session 1 2 3 4 5 6
Population Student Mixed Mixed Non-student Student Non-student
No. of subjects 20 24 24 24 20 16
Date 19/02/09 20/02/09 23/02/09 24/02/09 25/02/09 27/02/09
Av. earnings ¿7.9 ¿8.7 ¿18.5 ¿8.4 ¿8.1 ¿12.2
Situation paid Auction Guessing Trust Guessing Auction Risk
Table 1: Session characteristics
2.2 Description of the games
1. Dictator game: We conducted a single-blind two-person dictator game. Random
pairs of subjects were formed and assigned the role of ‘sender’ or ‘receiver’ . 5 The
sender was told that she had been allocated ¿10 and was asked to indicate the amount
she wished to transfer to the receiver.
2. Trust game: We conducted a two-person binary trust game. Random pairs of
subjects were formed and assigned the role of ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ . The sender
received ¿10 and had to choose whether to transfer them to the receiver or to keep
them. The money was then tripled by the experimenter and the receiver had to
decide whether to keep the resulting ¿30 or split them evenly (¿15-¿15).
3. Guessing game: All participants in one session took part in the same guessing
game. They had to guess the closest number to two-thirds of the average guess.
The winner won ¿20, the rest nothing. In the event of ties, one of the winners was
selected randomly.
4. Repeated public good game: Our public good game uses a standard Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) whereby the amount of public good produced is
determined by the total contribution in the group (Ledyard, 1995). The game has
a unique equilibrium of full free-riding (dominant strategy in the one-shot game,
unique Nash in the ￿nitely repeated game). Our experimental environment mirrors
those of previous experiments. Four subjects are endowed with 20 tokens. A subject
5Both in the dictator game and the trust game we used the labels ‘person 1’ and ‘person 2’ for senders
and receivers respectively.
7can either keep these tokens for herself or invest them into a so-called ‘project’ by
contributing gi. The payo￿ function was the following:




The size of the project is just given by the sum of all contributions gi to it. The
marginal payo￿ of a contribution to the public good is 0.4 tokens.
5. Second price sealed bid auction: We conducted a second-price auction with all
the subjects in one session bidding for a single unit of a commodity under a sealed-bid
procedure. The high bidder paid the price of the second highest bidder and earned
pro￿t equal to her valuation less the price paid. Other bidders earned zero pro￿t.
In the event of ties, one of the winners was selected randomly. Private valuations
were assigned randomly with one-fourth of the subjects bidding for ¿4 and a similar
proportion bidding for ¿6, ¿8, and ¿10.
2.3 Experimental Treatments
In each session, each subject played ￿ve di￿erent games. Three of our games invoke other
regarding preferences: the Dictator Game (non strategic and one-shot); the Trust Game
(strategic and one-shot); and the Public Good Game (strategic and repeated). We can
evaluate learning in the Public Good Game because it is repeated. Two of our games involve
cognitive capabilities and no other-regarding preferences: Beauty-contest (or Guessing
Game); and the Second-price sealed bid auction.
Our analyses concentrate on the Nash equilibrium strategy based on monetary payo￿s -the
homo-economicus equilibrium strategy, assuming sel￿shness and rationality and common
knowledge of rationality. For the Guessing Game, in which the Nash equilibrium is for
subjects to report 0, this is not very informative because only one subject does so in our
sample. Alternatively, it is common for this game (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002) to
de￿ne equilibrium strategies according to depths of levels of reasoning. Level 0 subjects
are non-sophisticated subjects and simply pick a number at random. Level 1 subjects best
respond to Level 0 subjects whose random picks will average around 50, thus report a
guess equal to 2=3 of 50. Level 2 subjects best respond to Level 1 subjects, thus report a
8guess equal to (2=3)2 of 50. More generally, the level of depth of reasoning, k, commands
a best response equal to 50  (2=3)k. We will consider the probability of reasoning of level
1 or more. The Nash equilibrium strategy for the other games are the following: Dictator
Game ￿ donate zero; Trust Game ￿ send zero and send back zero; Public Goods Game
￿ contribute zero. For the second-price sealed bid auction, the equilibrium is de￿ned as
bidding the private value or the private value +0:1$ (Kagel and Levin, 1993).
Our primary concern is comparing behaviour between student and non-student subject
pools. Accordingly, two sessions include only students and two consist only of non-students.
To test whether behavior is conditional on the characteristics of the subjects one is playing
with, we supplemented these four homogeneous sessions with two heterogeneous sessions
with student and non-student subjects.
2.4 Individual-level covariates
We will describe variations in student and non-student characteristics and their implication
for the analysis of experimental data from di￿erent types of subject pools. Accordingly we
have information on the subjects’ age, gender, ethnicity and professional status.
We have two measures of cognitive ability. First, in the case of each experiment, we asked
them to describe an example of a possible outcome, immediately after the instructions were
read. The goal was to obtain a measure of understanding without priming them in any
particular way. Second, subjects took a short 12-minute version of an IQ test, consisting
of 4 components: Numerical computation (calculation), numerical reasoning (e.g. logical
series), abstract reasoning (￿gures and series) and verbal ability (e.g. analogies). Subjects
had a limited amount of time for each component (2/3 minutes), and they received ¿0.20
for each correct answer.6
6We selected 26 questions in total from an on-line psychometric test battery: www.psychometric-
success.com. We sampled the questions according to their levels of di￿culty, including very easy, easy and
more di￿cult questions. The level of di￿culty is typically increasing in such tests, so we selected questions
from the beginning, the middle and the end, to ensure we could capture well di￿erences in cognitive ability
across subjects.
9We also elicit risk preferences in the ￿rst part of the experiment (situation 5). Since we
expect non-students to be quite heterogeneous in their mathematical ability, we chose a
simple strategy method to elicit risk preferences (Chetan, Eckel and Rojas, 2010). They
are presented with eight successive choices between a safe amount (¿5) and a lottery. The
lottery gave them a 50% chance of earning a positive amount (which decreased by ¿1 in
each case from ¿14 in the ￿rst case to ¿7 in the last case) and a 50% chance earning
nothing. We told them that we would select one of the cases randomly to determine the
payo￿ for this situation.
3 Experimental results
3.1 Covariate di￿erences across subject pools
The socio-demographic composition of student and non-student subject pools may account
for di￿erences in subject pool behaviour. In our multivariate analysis we explore whether
co-variate controls account for behavioural di￿erences across subject pools. But the power
of these controls is very much contingent upon the range of values these variables assume
within each of the subject pools. To the extent that there is restricted variance in the
covariates, our multivariate results could be highly sensitive to model speci￿cation (Gelman
and Hill, 2007). A key requirement in introducing these controls is that the range of values
on the covariates be similar across the convenience samples (or treatment groups) that are
being compared ￿ in our case the student and non-student subjects (Rubin, 1978). Hence,
we are concerned not simply with comparing measures of central tendency but also with
whether the range of values on the covariates for our student subjects is similar to that of
the non-student subject pool.
The degree of consistency in responses to the risk items is low given the simplicity of the
question: About a third of the subjects (in both pools) switch back and forth (at least once)
between the ‘safe’ and the ‘risky’ alternative.7 Figure 1a presents the distribution of risk
7Non-unique switching points is not uncommon in these types of experiments ￿ Holt and Laury (2002)
elicit risk preferences in a similar fashion and report 19.9 percent of the subjects exhibited non-unique
switching behviour.
10attitudes among those who remain consistent across the eight di￿erent cases. Non-students
tend to be less risk averse on average. More students are at the zero point, rejecting any
uncertainty in terms of the pay-o￿s. Nevertheless, encouragingly, we get a similar range of
values across both the student and non-student subjects.
Figure 1: Distribution of Covariance Variables: Student and Non-Student Subjects
11Students have a much higher average IQ score (350 for non-students and 415 for students)
which is not entirely surprising. More interestingly, Figure 1b indicates that there is a
considerable range of IQ scores for which there is no overlap between students and non-
students. While non-students have a range of IQ scores that go from just above 100 to
500, student IQ scores range from about 250 to 500.
Virtually by de￿nition the non-student subject pool will be older than the student subjects
(34 against 23 years old). Figure 1c presents the age distribution in the two subject pools.
And while hardly surprising, the plots indicate that there is a signi￿cant age range for
which there is no overlap in the non-student and student subject pools. The age range
between 35 and 70, which exists in the non-student subject pool, does not exist in the
student sample.
Finally, we measure comprehension by tallying each of our experimental checks to come up
with a total comprehension score that ranges between zero and six. On average, compre-
hension is higher amongst student subjects (5.3) than non-student subjects (4.9). Figure
1d presents the comprehension distribution overlays for student and non-student subjects.
Again there are regions of the comprehension distribution for which students e￿ectively
have no observations ￿ i.e., the very low comprehension levels. This reinforces a widely held
belief that aggregate comprehension of the game form may be higher in student subject
pools.
As we expected students and non-students have di￿erent average covariate values. A more
noteworthy ￿nding is that for a number of the covariates there are ranges of values for
which there are no overlap for students and non-students. This is the case for IQ, age
and comprehension. Controlling on these covariates in a conventional multi-variate model
will generate results that are sensitive to model speci￿cation because the ￿tted model is
forced to extrapolate beyond the support of the data. Hence, in the case of this particular
student/non-student subject pool, controlling on IQ, age and (or) comprehension may
not provide meaningful insights about treatment e￿ects because there are observations for
which we have no empirical counterfactuals (for example, we do not have an opportunity to
observe whether low IQ students are more other-regarding).8 More generally, this suggests
8There are of course strategies for dealing with the problem of covariate imbalance, such as matching,
12caution in introducing control variables when estimating treatment e￿ects on experimental
data that are generated from convenience samples which frequently are imbalanced on the
covariates of interest.
3.2 Aggregate di￿erences in game behaviour across subject pools
We begin by comparing student versus non-student behaviour for each of the ￿ve games.
Table 2 reports the percentage of subjects playing the homo-economicus equilibrium strat-
egy, that is the equilibrium strategy if the subject is rational and sel￿sh (cares about his
own monetary payo￿s). The di￿erences between students and non-students are striking:
In all games with the exception of the auction game, we ￿nd that students are more likely
to behave as a homo-economicus agent.9
Game (Non-students) (Students) Mann-Whitney test of equality (p-value)
Dictator 17 57 .00
Trust - sender 18 65 .00
Trust - receiver 13 44 .01
Public Good 9 24 .03
Guessing 32 56 .00
Auction 26 37 .21
Table 2: Percentage playing the homo-economicus equilibrium strategy
In general our dictator game results are in line with previous literature. Dictator games
in which the recipients are anonymous result in average donations that fall between 10
and 15 percent (Ho￿man and Smith, 1994; Ho￿man, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Eckel and
Grossman, 1996). The average donation for our student sample was 16 percent which is
similar to these other ￿ndings (which, again, are typically based on student subject pools).
Fifty-seven percent of our student samples donated nothing which again is consistent with
other ￿ndings ￿ Eckel and Grossman (1996), for example, ￿nd that 63 percent of their
although these have been developed with a particular emphasis on observational and ￿eld experiment data
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Rubin, 1973).
9Independent analyses for each game are shown in appendix A.
13student subject pool donate nothing when the recipient is anonymous. Seventeen percent
of our non-students donated nothing which is less than a third of the student subject pool
result. Duch and Palmer (2004) similarly ￿nd a reluctance of general population samples
to make no donation ￿ in their representative sample from Benin only eight percent made
this choice. The average donation of our non-students is 35 percent of the maximum; about
twice the average donation of the students. This 2-1 non-student-student ratio is roughly
the di￿erence in donations that Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen (2005) ￿nd between
Middlebury students and Kansas City workers.
Our binary trust game results are also consistent with other studies. Subjects in trust
experiments typically invest and reciprocate. Relatively small percentages of trustors give
nothing: In their base-line treatment Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) ￿nd that 90
percent of ￿rst movers invest; in a similar trust experiment Ortmann, Fitzgerald and
Boeing (2000) and Eckel and Wilson (2004) ￿nd that 80 percent of ￿rst movers invest.
In a binary trust experiment very similar to ours, Casari and Cason (2009) report that
73 percent of their student subjects (designated as trustors) trusted by investing. Our
non-student participants behaviour resemble these results: 82 percent of ￿rst movers were
trusting. But our student subjects are clear outliers; only 35 percent of our student trustors
trust.
Rates of reciprocation in binary trust games typically are in the range of 50-60 percent.
Casari and Cason (2009), for example, report a rate of reciprocation of 60 percent for
their student subjects. Fifty-six percent of our non-student trustees reciprocate while 87
percent of non-student second-movers reciprocated. In the case of reciprocation we ￿nd
that our students are roughly consistent with reciprocation results in other studies while
our non-student subjects are very much a positive outlier.
Our third other-regarding game is the public good game ￿ this is the one game that
involved repeated play (10 rounds). As Table 2 indicates, students are considerably more
likely to behave in the homo economicus fashion by free-riding: in the ￿rst round of the
public goods game, 24 percent of the students contributed nothing to the public good
while only 9 percent of non-students were strictly non-cooperative. Gachter, Herrmann
and Thoni (2004) conduct a similar, although one-shot, public good game with students
and non-students. Their results suggest, consistent with ours, that non-students are more
14cooperative than students: non-students contributed an average of 10.2 tokens (out of
20) while students contributed 8.8 (Gachter, Herrmann and Thoni, 2004). The average
contribution of our non-students in the ￿rst round was 11.1 (out of 20) compared to 9.9
for students; in the last round the average contributions, respectively, were 5.4 and 4.8. 10
On balance the patterns in both studies are similar and provide quite convincing evidence
that students are less cooperative than non-student subject pools.
All three of our experiments involving other-regarding preferences demonstrate, consistent
with virtually all of the experimental literature, that subjects, in general, are more trust-
ing and more cooperative than classic theory would predict. And of course there have
been considerable e￿orts to incorporate this "kindness" into models of economic behaviour
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The three empirical results presented above leave little doubt
that students are dramatically more non-cooperative and less trusting than non-student
subjects. Why is this the case? Andreoni (1995) correctly directs our attention to two
contributing explanations for cooperation: confusion and kindness.
Comparing these other-regarding games in terms of their complexity suggests that the
di￿erences across subject pools are not simply the result of confusion. The dictator game
is extremely simple; the trust game is somewhat more complex in that ￿rst movers should
consider the likely behaviour of second movers; and ￿nally the public good game requires
more complex strategic calculations related to collective action and free riding. But there
is no evidence that non-students are less cooperative in the very simple, as opposed to
more complex, other-regarding games. In fact, Table 2 suggests that, very roughly, the
ratio of non-cooperative students to non-cooperative non-students is a reasonably constant
3 to 1 for all three games. Second, confusion implies that over the course of repeated
games non-students learn at a slower rate than students. But the learning results from
the public goods game suggest no di￿erence in the rate of learning by students and non-
students. Hence, the student/non-student di￿erences in our other-regarding games suggest
that non-students, rather than being confused, are simply "kinder" than students which
results in higher levels of trust and cooperation.
10The di￿erences between their results and ours might be associated with the fact that theirs is a one-shot
game and ours is a repeated public goods game. Although one might speculate that this would increase
the free-riding in the Gachter, Herrmann and Thoni (2004) experiment.
15Our two other games ￿ the Auction and Beauty-contest games ￿ are a more direct test
of whether there are systematic di￿erences in the student/non-student comprehension and
reasoning abilities. They involve no other-regarding preferences and are distinctly more
cognitively challenging than the other three games. In these games students are more likely
to make the homo-economicus equilibrium choice; but the magnitude of these di￿erences is
much smaller than it was for other-regarding games. Table 2 suggests that for the Beauty-
contest the ratio of student equilibrium choices to non-students equilibrium choices is
roughly 2 to 1 compared to the 3-1 ratio for the other regarding games. And for the
second-price sealed bid auction game the ratio is even smaller 1.5 to 1.
The unique equilibrium for the Beauty-contest is 0, yet typically the percentage of subjects
choosing 0 in experiments is less than 10 percent (Camerer, 1997; Nagel, 1995) ￿ only one
non-student subject in our experiment selected 0. On balance, students exhibit higher
levels of iterative reasoning although the di￿erences are less stark than with other-regarding
games. Thirty percent of our non-student subjects made choices consistent with at least
level 1 iterative reasoning compared to 56 percent for the student subjects. Although in
the case of, roughly, level 2 iterative reasoning, students and non-students are more similar
(21 and 15 percent, respectively).
The average guess of our student subjects is 38 which is consistent with similar guessing
games results (in which the average is multiplied by two-thirds). Nagel (1995) ￿nds that
the average guess is 35. Camerer (1997) conducted multiple Beauty-contest experiments
(with a multiple of .70 applied to the mean) and found the average guesses, for mostly
student subject pools, ranged between 31 and 40. Our non-student subject pool exhibited
somewhat less iterative rationality with an average guess of 46.
In a second-price sealed bid auction, individuals should bid their private value (Kagel and
Levin, 1993). Thirty-seven percent of our student subjects bid their private value. Again
this is consistent with other experimental results; Kagel and Levin (1993) ￿nd that 37
percent of students bid their private value in a second-price sealed bid auction. Our non-
students are somewhat less likely to behave rationally and bid their private value ￿ 26
percent of non-students behave in this fashion. But these di￿erences are not statistically
di￿erent. And an analysis of average bids for students and non-students (see Table 11
in Appendix A) suggests that both students and non-students on average have bids that
16approximate their private value. Hence, for this particular game form there is essentially
no di￿erence in student and non-student behaviour.
We included strategic reasoning games in our experiment to explore whether variations in
strategic reasoning skills across convenience samples might lead to di￿erent results in these
games. There is little evidence here that student subjects exhibit more developed strategic
reasoning skills than the non-students. For the strategic reasoning games, students are only
weakly more likely than non-students to behave in a homo-economicus fashion in the case
of the Beauty-contest; and for the auction game they have the same levels of equilibrium
behaviour. Particularly given the very large student/non-student di￿erences we saw in the
case of other-regarding games, it seems reasonable to conclude that in the case of strategic
reasoning games students are only marginally more homo-economicus than non-student
subjects.
There is some evidence here that cognitively demanding game forms signi￿cantly reduce
equilibrium behaviour. Both students and non-students are less likely to make equilibrium
choices in the Public Good game than in the other two other-regarding games. One could
attribute this to the complexity of the game form. On the other hand we note that students
exhibit levels of equilibrium play in the two strategic reasoning games that are not very
di￿erent than in the other-regarding games. And for non-students, levels of equilibrium
play are clearly higher in the cognitively demanding games but of course its di￿cult to draw
any conclusions here because of the confounding a￿ect of non-student other-regardedness.
We defer to the multi-variate analyses in order to tease out the independent impact of
complexity of game form on equilibrium behaviour.
3.3 Within-subject Behaviour Across Games
The frequency with which lab experiment subjects exhibit non-equilibrium behaviour has
lead some to conclude that there are "types" in the population that correspond to some
version of "egoists" and "non-egoists" (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Bowles and Gintis,
2004; Habyarimana et al., 2009). For the most part the evidence regarding types has
focused on other regarding preferences and it has relied on student subject pools. Our
experiment allows us to address a more general question: Are there types in the population,
17or at least in our convenience samples, that consistently play homo-economicus in both
other-regarding games and in games that do not engage other-regarding preferences? And
in the case of both of these behavioural types, our experiments allow us to determine
whether we are more, or less, likely to identify these types if we rely on a student versus
non-student subject pool.
The stark contrasts between student and non-student behaviour suggest that homo-
economicus and non-homo-economicus types will be concentrated in the student and non-
student subject pools respectively. Homo-economicus types are subjects that consistently
make equilibrium choices across the ￿ve experimental games. There are no non-students
who are pure homo-economicus and in fact only four non-students make more than two
equilibrium choices. But even amongst the student subjects, there is only one subject
that makes all ￿ve equilibrium choices; and only 19 students (about a third of the stu-
dent subjects) make more than two equilibrium choices. This result is driven largely by
the fact that there are few student (or non-student) subjects that are consistently homo-
economicus in the two games that are relatively cognitively demanding and do not engage
other regarding preferences. There is no compelling evidence here of a signi￿cant group of
consistent homo-economicus individuals in the subject pools.
There are distinct other-regarding types although their behaviour di￿ers by subject pool.
If we de￿ne other-regarding types simply in terms of whether they never (or always) play
equilibrium in other-regarding games then the non-student subject pool is unquestion-
ably other-regarding: over 70 percent of non-student subjects selected none of the homo-
economicus choices in the three other-regarding experiments (and none play equilibrium).
The student subjects are somewhat less distinct on this count: 35 percent of students never
play equilibrium while 10 percent always give zero.
An even stronger claim, again based primarily on other-regarding games played by stu-
dent subjects, is that other-regarding preferences conform to axioms of revealed preference.
Theories of other-regarding preferences presume that inequity averse parameter estimates
can be recovered from revealed preferences which assume consistent within-subject choices
across other-regarding experiments, where choices are de￿ned in terms of degrees of in-
equity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Andreoni and
Miller (2002) ￿nd that subjects’ choices across variants of the same game are consistent
18with the axioms of revealed preferences although the results of Blanco, Engelmann and Nor-
mann (2010) are less consistently supportive for subjects playing di￿erent other-regarding
games.
We can assess the consistency of subject choices, across di￿erent types of other-regarding
games, by correlating the amount subjects give across the three other-regarding games;
and, of course, we can compare consistency of students and non-students. For students,
the amount given in the dictator game has a .47 correlation with the trustor’s contribution
in the binary trust game (and only .05 for non-students); the dictator amount has a .46
correlation with the Public Goods Game contribution for students (-.13 for non-students);
and the PGG and trustor’s contributions have a .19 correlation for students (.03 for non-
students).
Non-student subjects are consistent in not playing equilibrium although the magnitudes
of their contributions exhibit high degrees of inconsistency across other-regarding games.
Students, on the other hand, are less likely to consistently play non-equilibrium; more
likely to consistently make equilibrium choices; and exhibit high degrees of consistency in
the magnitudes of their contributions. The di￿erences in within-subject choices (across
di￿erent types of other-regarding games) by non-students versus students suggest that
experimental results concerning axioms of revealed preference may be conditioned by the
nature of the subject pools selected.
3.4 Design E￿ects
Design e￿ects result when treatment e￿ects are confounded with how the theoretical treat-
ment is implemented - whether respondents understood the game form or whether the lab
environment itself a￿ects behaviour. We examine whether design e￿ects might account for
di￿erences in subject pool behaviour.
Subject comprehension of the game form is one feature of the experimental design that
might account for di￿erences across subject pool types. We argued that the student/non-
student di￿erences in other-regarding games suggest that these groups have signi￿cantly
di￿erent levels of trust and inequity aversion. It seems unlikely that these di￿erences could
19be attributed to comprehension. If the student/non-student di￿erences for the other-
regarding games were the result of comprehension we might expect these di￿erences to
erode with repeated play of other-regarding games. Our repeated play of the public goods
game suggests that both students and non-students become more homo-economicus over
the repeated plays but di￿erences in cooperative behaviour persist. By the ￿nal play of the
public goods game both our student and non-student subjects make highly non-cooperative
decisions: 53 percent of students choose to give nothing (none chose the option of 1 token);
29 percent of non-students give nothing while 12 percent give 1. Students maintain their
non-cooperative edge but it declines over the course of the repeated plays. Our student
results closely tract the results of Andreoni (1995) who conducted similar 10-round public
goods games with student subject pools: In the ￿rst round of his PGG experiment, 20
percent contribute nothing and in round 10, 45 percent contribute nothing (Andreoni,
1995). Figure 2 compares the non-cooperation in the Andreoni (1995) experiments with
the evolution of non-cooperation by students and non-students in our experiment. Note
our two subject pools behave similarly over the course of repeated plays in that their
non-cooperative behaviour increases quite signi￿cantly. Moreover, both rates of increase


















































Figure 2: Percentage of Subjects Contributing Nothing by Round in Repeated Public
Goods Game
21Table 3 reports the results for a simple test for di￿erences in learning behaviour. We model
the probability of contributing zero as a function of the student subject pool dummy, the
number of rounds, and the interaction of the student dummy and number of rounds. We
￿nd that there is a positive trend. The proportion of subjects contributing zero increases
by roughly 2 percentage points in the early rounds and this rises to about 3.2 percent in
the ￿nal rounds. But we fail to ￿nd any evidence of di￿erences in trends between the two
subject pools (the interaction term is indistinguishable from zero). Rates of learning by
students and non-students are similar suggesting that both subject pools respond similarly,
over iterative play, to the non-cooperative incentives of the game. This seems inconsistent
with the notion that the two subject pools have di￿ering levels of comprehension (or
respond di￿erently to the lab environment). Also, if the di￿erences in other-regardedness
we observed are simply the result of di￿erential comprehension levels, we would expect them
to diminish signi￿cantly over repeated play. The fact that di￿erences in other-regardedness
persist in spite of learning lends support for the notion that these two subject pools have
di￿erent levels of inequity aversion and trust.
Probability of contributing 0 (probit estimates)
Student dummy 0.16
(0.08)
Number of rounds 0.03
(0.007)




Standard errors are clustered by subject
Table 3: Learning in the public good game
Another possible explanation for these signi￿cant subject pool di￿erences is that the lab
context di￿erentially triggers other-regardedness in non-students versus students. Levitt
and List (2007b,a) suggest that the "nature and extent of scrutiny associated with the
lab" might induce subjects to conform to social norms against wealth maximizing choices
(Levitt and List, 2007a). Students might be more comfortable than non-students with the
22scrutiny associated with the lab environment and hence less sensitive to norms regarding
sel￿sh behaviour. This might explain lower levels of other-regardedness amongst students.
We have an indirect measure of whether our student/non-student di￿erences in other-
regardedness are replicated outside of the laboratory environment.
Two weeks after the experiment, subjects received a thank-you e-mail that also asked them
how they had been informed about the lab. This requests a form of cooperation that is
only bene￿cial to us; is not personal in any way; and in principle involves little cost. This
test enables us to obtain a di￿erent measure of other-regarding preferences outside the lab
and in a natural context (this kind of e-mail is relatively common practice and there is
no reason to expect di￿erences in familiarity between students and non-students). Again,
we ￿nd systematic di￿erences between students and non-students. 53% of the students
replied to the e-mail against 72% of the non-students (this di￿erence is signi￿cant at the
2% level). Thus, the student/non-student di￿erences we reported earlier do not seem to
be an artefact of the laboratory setting.
3.5 Explaining di￿erences in behaviour - A multivariate analysis
We now turn to a multivariate analysis of the di￿erence in subject pool behaviour. Our
primary concern is whether students di￿er from non-students; whether the di￿erences can
be attributed to preferences or cognitive reasoning abilities; whether these di￿erences are
conditional on covariates; and whether design e￿ects, i.e., features of the experimental
session, exaggerate or moderate these di￿erences.
The subjects are e￿ectively assigned to two experimental treatments: they are assigned to
one of j = 6 sessions; and all subjects play each of the k = 5 games. In our estimations, the
two treatments will be modeled as second-level characteristics in a two-level hierarchical
model. Accordingly, these two, second-level treatments, result in 6  5 = 30 treatment
cells. And of course the model is non-nested because subjects are not nested within a
particular game treatment, i.e., they play each game.
Our central concern is in fact with individual-level variation within these cells ￿ speci￿-
cally, the gap in equilibrium behaviour between student and non-student subjects. This is




1   Pr(yijk = 1)

= 0jk + 1jkPijk + 2Zijk (1)
where i indexes subjects; j indexes sessions; k indexes the type of game the subjects
are playing; and yijk is a dichotomous variable assuming a value of 1 when the subject
selects the homo-economicus predicted equilibrium behaviour. The estimate of interest
is the mean probability of behaving according to the equilibrium prediction (recall yijk
is a dichotomous variable). The dummy variable, Pijk, indicates whether a subject is
associated with the student subject pool and hence 1jk is our estimate of the degree to
which students respond di￿erently from non-students to the treatments. Given the two
treatment e￿ects, we estimate for 0jk and for 1jk the random e￿ects associated with the
j sessions and k games:
0jk = 0 + j + k (2)
1jk = 0 + j + !k (3)
We also speculated that this non-student gap in equilibrium behaviour may be moderated
by other individual-level characteristics. Accordingly, we include a moderating variable,
Zijk, that potentially a￿ects the magnitude of the student/non-student gap in equilibrium
behaviour.
We explore four individual-level covariates that possibly explain di￿erences in behaviour:
￿ Cognitive ability: Students and non-students may di￿er in the level of understanding
of the instructions, the game, and how they derive the equilibrium strategy of a game.
Cognitive ability matters in the understanding of the instructions and of the game,
as well as in backward induction and strategic thinking. For instance, using a sample
24of 1,000 trainee truckers, Burks et al. (2009) ￿nd that an individual’s cognitive skills
are related to their preferences in di￿erent choice domains.
￿ Demographics: Students presumably are younger and come from a more homoge-
neous socio-economic background. Regarding age, there is a body of empirical liter-
ature suggesting that trust is positively correlated with age (Midlarsky, 1989; Yen,
2002). Sutter and Kocher (2007) ￿nd that trust increases almost linearly from early
childhood to early adulthood, but stays rather constant between di￿erent adult age
groups. Croson and Gneezy (2009) point out that the literature suggests gender dif-
ferences in three areas: risk preferences, social preferences and competitive behavior.
Gender and intelligence have been correlated with overbidding in Common Value
Auctions (Casari, Ham and Kagel, 2007).
￿ Risk Attitudes: A large class of games in economics involve risk, and di￿erences in
behavior in these games could therefore be due to di￿erences in risk attitudes. As we
pointed out earlier only 86 of the 128 subjects report consistent results on the risk
preference game ￿ including this variable in the multivariate analysis signi￿cantly
reduces the number of observations in the multivariate analysis because we treat
the inconsistent respondents as missing values. The risk measure, for consistent
respondents, ranges in value from -4 for those who always select the lottery to +4 for
those who never select the lottery. The zero value is assigned to those who switch to
the certain outcome when the certain outcome and the expected value of the lottery
are equal.
The 2 coe￿cient captures the e￿ect of Zijk on subject choices in these games.11 To the
extent that the covariates are moderating the treatment e￿ect, their coe￿cients should
account for much of the di￿erences across subject pools, reducing the magnitude of 1 in
particular.
The estimates for Equation 1 are reported in Model 1 of Table 4. Our hypothesized student
e￿ect here is only weakly signi￿cant: while the coe￿cient on the student dummy variable
indicates that students are more likely than non-student subjects to play the equilibrium
11Zijk of course could be a vector of covariates ￿ to simplify this exposition we treat it as a single
variable.
25homo-economicus strategy, the estimate is quite imprecise. The standard deviation for !k,
which is the random component of the student e￿ect associated with the game treatment,
suggests why this is the case. Note that the standard deviation for !k is about 1.0 which
is almost twice the standard deviation of the ￿xed student e￿ect (.54). This suggests that
the model is not capturing variations in the student e￿ect that are associated with features
of the game treatments. This is not particularly surprising since we know from our earlier
discussion that student e￿ects appear to be conditioned on game type.
Model 2 in Table 4 incorporates the individual-level covariates.12 The results from adding
these particular covariates are conclusive: the student/non-student di￿erences are not
conditioned on the set of covariates available for our subject pools. 13 The IQ test, com-
prehension, age and gender variables are all statistically insigni￿cant in this model and
they remain insigni￿cant in subsequent model speci￿cations. Note that the variance terms
capturing the random e￿ects associated with sessions and games essentially remain the
same. Not surprisingly, the likelihood-ratio test and Wald test of the joint signi￿cance of
the four covariates both indicate their statistical insigni￿cance.
12The risk preference covariate is treated separately below.
13A reasonable argument might be that our estimates of the e￿ects of introducing these covariate controls
are unreliable because of the problems noted earlier regarding the non-overlapping of covariate values for
student and non-student subjects. But we performed analyses that only included the cases that had
overlapping values and our conclusions were similar.
26Table 4: Generalized Linear Mixed Model Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Student 0.9532 1.15 0.90 2.82 3.04
(.54) (.57) (.59) (.72) (.89)
Hetero .41 .42 .76
(.41) (.41) (.51)
Student X Hetero .36 .35 .03
(.52) (.52) (.65)
Game Type -0.48 -.47
(.55) (.54)
Student X Game Type -.84 -0.73
(.31) (.36)
IQ Test 0.001 0.001 .001 0.0003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Age -.003 -0.003 -.003 0.01
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Gender -.33 -0.32 -.65 -.51
(.25) (.25) (.25) (.31)
Risk Averse 0.04
(.06)
Comprehension -.74 -.81 -0.65 -0.33
(.36) (.41) (.36) (.43)
Intercept -2.17 -1.75 -1.97 -1.12 -1.71
(.49) (1.18) (1.17) (1.62) (1.85)
StDev j .23 .25 .00 .07 .09
StDev k .97 1.05 1.03 .98 .91
StDev j .04 .15 .00 .00 .07
StDev !k 1.03 .93 .93 .21 .14
Observations 576 506 506 506 346
27One of our second-level treatment e￿ects is designed to estimate whether the student/non-
student gap in equilibrium behaviour is a￿ected by the homogeneity of the session. For
example, other-regarding preferences might be undermined in homogeneous contexts be-
cause subjects are less inhibited to play competitively (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009).
Hence, student/non-student di￿erences in equilibrium behaviour may be minimized in ho-
mogeneous experimental sessions. Accordingly, the session treatment (Tj) in our model
assumes two values: a homogeneous treatment in which subjects play with their own "type"
(either students or non-students); and a heterogenous treatment in which the subjects are
both students and non-students. Our expectation was that the student e￿ect will vary
by session type although the random e￿ects associated with this treatment suggest this is
probably not the case.
Features of game-type, the other second-level treatment in our design, are also hypothe-
sized to condition the student e￿ect. The subjects in our experiment play ￿ve di￿erent
experimental games that vary in terms of whether they are cognitively challenging or other-
regarding. To measure this feature of game type we de￿ne Gk as a trichotomous variable
indicating whether the game was other-directing; both cognitively challenging and other-
directing; or cognitively challenging.
Our student gap in equilibrium behaviour, captured by the coe￿cient 1jk, will vary as a
function of our two second-level experimental treatments. The second-level equation that
incorporates these two treatment e￿ects is:
1jk = 0 + 1Tj + 2Gk + j + !k (4)
We would also incorporate ￿xed e￿ects associated with the two second-level experimental
treatments, i.e., the notion that the probability of equilibrium behaviour varies systemat-
ically as a function of each of the two treatments:
0jk = 0 + 1Tj + 2Gk + j + k (5)








Of particular interest to us in Equation 6 is 0, which is an estimate of the general
student/non-student gap in equilibrium behviour, and the 1 and 2 coe￿cients that indi-
cate the extent to which this e￿ect is conditioned on the two experimental treatments. 14
Model 3 in Table 4 incorporates our ￿rst second-level treatment e￿ect. The model estimates
the 1 and 1 terms associated with the Tj treatment: a dummy variable for students and
non-students sessions and its interaction with the Student e￿ect dummy variable. As
expected from the random e￿ects results earlier, the coe￿cients on both variables are
not statistically signi￿cant suggesting there is no strong evidence here that equilibrium
behaviour, or the student/non-student gap in equilibrium behaviour, is a￿ected by the
homogeneity/heterogeneity treatment e￿ects.
Model 4 adds estimates for 2 and 2 which are associated with the Game Type treatment
(Gk). Note that the student e￿ect in this model, captured by 0, is now highly signi￿-
cant. The student-game interaction term, (2), is also statistically signi￿cant suggesting
that the student e￿ect is exaggerated in games that are other-regarding. Students gener-
ally exhibit more homo-economicus behaviour than non-students but they are particularly
homo-economicus when they play games that are inherently other-regarding. Finally note
that, when we explicitly model the impact of game treatment on the student e￿ect,the
standard deviation on the random e￿ects associated with game type, !k, falls to about .2
from .9.
Finally, Model 5 includes the Risk Attitude variable. Risk Attitude is not signi￿cant in
this model. Note though that, for reasons pointed out earlier, we loose a third of our
cases. Accordingly we are hesitant to draw any strong conclusions from the Risk Attitude
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= Tj[1 +1Pijk]+Gk[2 +2Pijk]+Pijk[0 +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2Zijk +0 +j +k (7)
The equation was estimated as a generalized linear mixed model in R. For details on the GLMM estimation
see (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
29result in this model. Our very tentative conclusion is that it does not help explain the
student/non-student gap in equilibrium behaviour.
This multivariate analysis suggests three insights about di￿erences in the equilibrium
behaviour of student and non-student subject pools. First, students exhibit more
homo-economicus behaviour than non-students. Second, students are particularly homo-
economicus when they play games that are inherently other-regarding ￿ the student/non-
student gap in equilibrium behaviour is comparatively small for games that do no invoke
other-regarding preferences. Third, demographic characteristics that one might expect to
be associated with variations in equilibrium behaviour ￿ gender, age, intelligence, and risk
aversion ￿ have no signi￿cant e￿ect on the behaviour of our subjects. This, of course, is
subject to our caveat regarding truncated values on some of these demographic variables.
3.5.1 Modeling Amount of Contributions for each Game
We can explore the same themes from the previous section by modeling the amount of
money subjects chose in each of the di￿erent games. Here we estimate a separate model
for each of the games, giving maximum opportunity for the e￿ects to vary across games.
The dependent variables are 1) the amount donated in the dictator game (hence only
subjects that were randomly selected to donate rather than receive); 2) the amount sent
in the trust game (we only report the amount sent ￿ the results are very similar for the
amount returned); 3) the contribution in the ￿rst round of the public goods game; 4) the
amount guessed in the Beauty-contest; and 5) the amount bid in the auction game (note
that this model includes a control for the subject’s private value).
The results are reported in Table 5 through Table 7. For each game, we estimate regres-
sion models for the total sample and for the sub-sample of subjects who, based on our
comprehension check, demonstrated that they understood the game. And in the case of
each of these two samples we estimate a model with only the student dummy variable and
the measure of IQ; and another model that includes these two variables plus gender and
age.15
15Note that for reasons explained earlier we lose large numbers of observations when we include Risk
Attitudes in the individual models. Accordingly we do not estimate a model with Risk Attitudes because
30These results con￿rm the multivariate ￿ndings in the previous section: First, the student
dummy variable is virtually the only statistically signi￿cant variable in these equations.
Again, consistent with the previous estimates, the student e￿ect is quite pronounced in the
other-regarding games ￿ the dictator and trust games ￿ but is not statistically signi￿cant in
the games that we characterize as more cognitively demanding ￿ the Public Goods, Beauty-
contest and Auction Games. Finally, two of the covariates, I.Q. and gender, never reach
statistical signi￿cance in any of the 20 equations. The one equation in which covariates
matter is in the Beauty-contest game where younger subjects are signi￿cantly more likely
to give lower guesses.
The student e￿ect in the more cognitive demanding games is on balance directionally
consistent with the notion that students play homo-economicus, although in any one of
these three models it is not statistically signi￿cant. First, in the case of the Public Goods
Game none of the explanatory variables predict the subjects’ choices. In fact, the variance
explained by our models is e￿ectively zero.16 In the Beauty-contest game the student
e￿ect approximates statistical signi￿cance in the reduced models with only student and
IQ but the introduction of age as a control variable clearly reduces it to insigni￿cance.
In the Auction Game the student dummy variable is not statistically signi￿cant. Hence
consistent with the multivariate analysis, there are decidedly smaller di￿erences between
students and non-students in the case of more cognitively demanding games.
the missing values on this variable results in a loss of about one-third of the cases.
16This result uses the contributions from the ￿rst of ten rounds of the Public Goods Game. We obtain
the same results using the ultimate round.
31Table 5: OLS Regression Model Results with Amounts Chosen as Dependent Variable
Total 1 Total 2 Understand 1 Understand 2
Dictator
Student -1.97 -1.49 -2.06 -1.56
(.54) (.69) (.53) (.68)
IQ Test 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002





Intercept 3.26 1.82 3.43 1.84
(1.16) (2.19) (1.14) (2.16)
AdjustedR
2 .17 .09 0.19 .11
Observations 64 56 63 55
Trust (Amount Sent)
Student -4.93 -5.87 -4.72 -5.96
(1.17) (1.40) (1.22) (1.52)
IQ Test 0.007 0.006 0.01 0.008





Intercept 5.61 5.95 4.25 5.92
(2.61) (4.01) (2.90) (4.37)
AdjustedR
2 .20 .28 0.19 .27
Observations 63 55 57 49
32Table 6: OLS Regression Model Results with Amounts Chosen as Dependent Variable
Total 1 Total 2 Understand 1 Understand 2
Public Goods Round 1
Student -0.72 -1.24 -2.21 -2.60
(1.39) (1.66) (1.71) (2.13)
IQ Test 0.007 -0.01 0.0004 0.0002





Intercept 13.54 14.34 12.68 13.62
(2.93) (5.13) (3.55) (6.26)
AdjustedR
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 126 111 91 82
33Table 7: OLS Regression Model Results with Amounts Chosen as Dependent Variable
(Continued)
Total 1 Total 2 Understand 1 Understand 2
Beauty-contest Guess
Student -5.04 1.39 -8.01 -1.52
(4.46) (5.20) (5.32) (6.23)
IQ Test 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04





Intercept 61.62 34.97 63.86 33.86
(9.32) (16.07) (12.68) (19.15)
AdjustedR
2 .04 .08 .08 .09
Observations 126 111 90 80
Auction Bid
Private Value 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.39
(.13) (.15) (.16) (.17)
Private * Student 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.35
(.19) (.21) (.21) (.23)
Student -1.69 -1.28 -2.50 -1.54
(1.44) (1.69) (1.63) (1.83)
IQ Test -0.0004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004





Intercept 2.79 2.22 4.24 3.20
(1.44) (2.36) (1.76) (2.64)
AdjustedR
2 .23 .21 0.26 .26
Observations 126 111 101 90
344 Discussion and conclusion
Our results suggest that in experiments that invoke other-regarding considerations, student
and non-student subject pools will make choices that are very di￿erent - students are more
likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than is the case for non-students. The student
subject pool was dramatically less kind and less trusting than the non-student subjects.
Fairly consistently across experiments, non-students were more other regarding by a ratio
of three-to-one. Our results suggest these di￿erences were not the result of features of the
experimental design such as comprehension or the unnatural nature of the lab experiment
context. Rather we are inclined to conclude that non-students are more inequity averse
and trusting.
While student subject pools may understate the extent of other-regardedness in the popula-
tion, they will likely overstate the degree of consistency in the magnitudes of contributions
in other-regarding games. Within-subject correlations of contributions in other-regarding
games is signi￿cantly higher amongst students than non-students. Hence experiments
based on student subject pools may exaggerate the extent to which other-regarding choices
are consistent with the axioms of revealed other-regarding preferences.
In experiments that are more cognitively demanding and that are unlikely to invoke other-
regarding considerations, student and non-student di￿erences are comparatively quite
small. Our results suggest that equilibrium behaviour in the strategic reasoning games
was low, in the classic sense, for both subject pool types. But in comparing equilibrium
play across the two game types, homo-economicus behaviour is in fact equal to, or higher
than, play in simple other-regarding games. Part of the explanation is that for non-students
equilibrium play in other-regarding games is very low (depressed, we argue, by their in-
equity aversion and trust preferences). Student behaviour in the two strategic reasoning
games was somewhat more homo-economicus than non-students. But the di￿erences are
small compared to those found in other-regarding games and they are not signi￿cant in
the multivariate analyses. There is no strong evidence here to suggest di￿erences in the
strategic reasoning abilities of student and non-student subject pools. The overall low
levels of equilibrium behaviour in strategic reasoning games, amongst both students and
non-students, is what mostly stands out.
35Student and non-student subject pools can di￿er quite signi￿cantly in terms of charac-
teristics that likely matter for the decisions they take in a typical economic experiment.
Students are better educated, score higher on standard IQ tests, exhibit higher levels of
comprehension for most experiments, and, of course, are younger. And it is particularly
noteworthy that for many of these characteristics, there is virtually no overlap with respect
to extreme values. Hence, for many student subject pools we never observe subjects who
are elderly, have low IQs or exhibit low comprehension levels. Given that student subjects
typically have values on key demographics that can be highly skewed or truncated, con-
trolling on these covariates in the multivariate analysis of experimental data may generate
misleading results.
With this caveat in mind, we explored whether the introduction of covariates as controls
attenuated or exaggerated student/non-student di￿erences. It turns out that these di￿er-
ences are very robust to multivariate analyses that control for a variety of demographic and
cognitive ability covariates. With only minor exceptions these individual-level demographic
covariates are not statistically signi￿cant in our multivariate models.
To the extent that experimenters are concerned with identifying subjects with motivations
conforming to the classic assumptions of game theoretic models, they should focus on
student subject pools and avoid non-students. This is particularly the case with games that
incorporate other regarding features, such as trust or dictator games. In the case of games
in which cognitive skills are critical to the internal validity of a particular experiment, the
results are more nuanced and the student/non-student di￿erences are not large. Similarly,
student subjects are more likely to provide experimenters with choices that are consistent
with the axioms of revealed other-regarding preferences.
36References
Andreoni, James. 1995. ￿Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confu-
sion.￿ American Economic Review 85:891￿904.
Andreoni, James and J. Miller. 2002. ￿Giving According to Garp: An Experimental Test
of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism.￿ Econometrica 70:737￿53.
Ball, S.B. and P.A. Chech. 1996. ￿Subject Pool Choice and Treatment E￿ects in Economic
Laboratory Research.￿ Research in Experimental Economics 6:239￿92.
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut and K. McCabe. 1995. ￿Trust, Reciprocity, and Social-History.￿
Games and Economic Behavior 10:122￿142.
Blanco, Mariana, Dirk Engelmann and Hans-Theo Normann. 2010. ￿A Within-Subject
Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences.￿ Games and Economic Behavior . Royal Hol-
loway, University of London.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2000. ￿A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Compe-
tition.￿ American Economic Review 90:166￿193.
Bosch-Domenech, Antoni, Jose G. Montaivo, Rosemarie Nagel and Albert Satorra. 2002.
￿One, Two, (Three), In￿nity...: Newspaper and Lab-Beauty Experiments.￿ American
Economic Review 92:1687￿1701.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2004. ￿The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooper-
ation in Heterogeneous Populations.￿ Theoretical Population Biology 65:17￿28.
Burks, Stephen V., Je￿rey P. Carpenter, Lorenz Goette and Aldo Rustichini. 2009. ￿Cog-
nitive Skills A￿ect Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior and Job Attachment.￿ Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106:7745￿7750.
Camerer, Collin F. 1997. ￿Progress in Behavioral Game Theory.￿ The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 11:167￿188.
Camerer, Collin F., Teck-Hua Ho and Juin Kuan Chong. 2002. ￿Sophisticated EWA Learn-
ing and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.￿ Journal of Economic Theory 104:137￿
88.
37Carpenter, Je￿rey, Cristina Connolly and Caitlin Knowles Myers. 2008. ￿Altruistic Behav-
ior in a Representative Dictator Experiment.￿ Experimental Economics 11:282￿298.
Carpenter, Je￿rey, Stephen Burks and Eric Verhoogen. 2005. ￿Workers: The E￿ects of So-
cial Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games.￿ Research in Experimental Economics
10:261￿290.
Casari, Marco, John C. Ham and John H. Kagel. 2007. ￿Selection Bias, Demographic Ef-
fects, and Ability E￿ects in Common Value Auction Experiments.￿ American Economic
Review 97:1278￿1304.
Casari, Marco and Timothy N. Cason. 2009. ￿The Strategy Method Lowers Measured
Trustworthy Behavior.￿ Economics Letters 103:157￿59.
Chetan, Dave, Catherine Eckel and Christian Rojas. 2010. ￿Eliciting Risk Preferences:
When is Simple Better?￿ Journal of Risk and Uncertainty . Unpublished.
Chou, Eileen, Margaret McConnell, Rosemarie Nagel and Charles R. Plott. 2009. ￿The
Control of Game Form Recognition in Experiments: Understanding Dominant Strategy
Failure in a Simple Two Person ’Guessing Game’.￿ Experimental Economics 12:159￿179.
Croson, Rachel and Uri Gneezy. 2009. ￿Gender Di￿erences in Preferences.￿ Journal of
Economic Literature 47:448￿74.
Danielson, Anders J. and Hakan J. Holm. 2007. ￿Do You Trust Your Brethen? Eliciting
Trust Attitudes and Trust Behavior in a Tanzanian Congregation.￿ Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 62:255￿271.
Depositario, D.P.T., R. M. Nayga Jr., Ximing Wu and Ti￿any P. Laude. 2009. ￿Should
Students be used as Subjects in Experimental Auctions.￿ Economics Letters 102:122￿24.
Duch, Raymond M. and Harvey D. Palmer. 2004. ￿Its Not Whether You Win or Lose,
but How You Play the Game: Self-Interest, Social Justice, and Mass Attitudes toward
Market Transition.￿ American Political Science Review 98:437￿452.
Eckel, Catherine and Philip Grossman. 1996. ￿Altruism in Anonymous Dicatator Games.￿
Games and Economic Behavior 16:181￿191.
Eckel, Catherine and Rick Wilson. 2004. ￿Is Trust a Risk Decision?￿ Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 55:447￿466.
38Egas, Martijn and Arno Riedl. 2008. ￿The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the
Maintenance of Cooperation.￿ Proceedings of the Royal Society 275:871￿78.
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger and A. Riedl. 1993. ￿Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An
Experimental Investigation.￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:437￿460.
Fehr, E. and K.M. Schmidt. 1999. ￿A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817￿68.
Fischbacher, U. 2007. ￿z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments.￿
Experimental Economics 10:171￿78.
Gachter, Simon, Benedikt Herrmann and Christian Thoni. 2004. ￿Trust, Voluntary Coop-
eration, and Socio-Economic Background: Survey and Experimental Evidence.￿ Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 55:505￿531.
Gelman, Andrew and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multi-
level/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge University Press.
Guth, W., R. Schmittberger and B. Schwarze. 1982. ￿An Experimental Analysis of Ulti-
matum Bargaining.￿ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3:367￿388.
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinis-
tein. 2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action . Russell Sage
Foundation.
Heckman, James J., H. Ichimura and P. Todd. 1997. ￿Matching as an Econometric Evalua-
tion Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program.￿ Review of Economic
Studies 64:605￿54.
Ho￿man, E., K. McCabe and V. Smith. 1994. ￿Preferences, Property Rights, and
Anonymity in Bargaining Games.￿ Games and Economic Behavior 7:346￿380.
Ho￿man, E., K. McCabe and V. Smith. 1996. ￿Social Distance and Other-Regarding
Behavior in Dicatator Games.￿ American Economic Review 86:653￿60.
Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury. 2002. ￿Risk Aversion and Incentive E￿ects.￿ American
Economic Review 92:1644￿1655.
39Kagel, John H. and Dan Levin. 1993. ￿Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behav-
ior in First-, Second- and Third-Price Value Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders.￿
The Economic Journal 103:868￿79.
Ledyard, J. 1995. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press chap-
ter Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007a. ￿Viewpoint: On the Generalizability of Lab
Behaviour to the Field.￿ Canadian Journal of Economics 40:347￿70.
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007b. ￿What do Laboratory Experiments Measuring
Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?￿ Journal of Economic Perspectives
21:153￿74.
McCullagh, P. and J.A. Nelder. 1989. Generalized Linear Models, 2nd Edition. Chapman
& Hall.
Midlarsky, E., M. Hannah. 1989. ￿The Generous Elderly: Naturalistic Studies of Donations
Across the Life Span.￿ Psychology and Aging 4:346￿341.
Morton, Rebecca and Kenneth Williams. 2009. From Nature to the Lab: Experimental
Political Science and the Study of Causality . Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, Rosemarie. 1995. ￿Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.￿ Amer-
ican Economic Review 85:1313￿1326.
Ortmann, Andreas, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing. 2000. ￿Trust, Reciprocity, and Social
History: A Re-examination.￿ Experimental Economics 3:81￿100.
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Oscar Volij. 2009. ￿Field Centipedes.￿ American Economic
Review 99:1619￿35.
Peterson, Robert A. 2001. ￿On the Use of College Students in Social Science Research:
Insights from a Second-Order Meta-analysis.￿ Journal of Consumer Research 28:450￿461.
Raudenbush, Stephen and Anthony Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical Linear Models. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rubin, Donald. 1973. ￿Matching to Remove Bias in Observational Studies.￿ Biometrics
29:159￿83.
40Rubin, Donald. 1978. ￿Bayesian Inference for Causal E￿ects: The Role of Randomization.￿
Annals of Statistics 6:34￿58.
Sutter, Matthais and Martin Kocher. 2007. ￿Trust and Trustworthiness across Di￿erent
Age Groups.￿ Games and Economic Behavior 59:364￿82.
Yen, S.T. 2002. ￿An Econometric Analysis of Household Donations in the USA.￿ Applied
Economic Letters 9:837￿841.
41Appendix A: Behavior in games
Non-students Students Mann-Whitney test of equality (p-value)
% sending ¿10 82 35 .00
% sending ¿15 back 87 56 .01
Table 8: Behaviour in the Trust Game
Non-students Students
% reporting 0 1.5 0
% reporting 20 or 21 3.1 6.3
% reporting reporting 32, 33 or 33.3 6.2 10.1
% reporting 50 7.7 6.4
% reporting < 20 15.4 20.6
% reporting < 33.3 32.3 54.0
% reporting < 50 64.6 74.6
average guess 45.9 38.3
Table 9: Behaviour in Guessing Game
Non-students Students Mann-Whitney test of equality (p-value)
average donation (std. dev) ¿3.5 (1.9) ¿1.6 (2.1) .00
Table 10: Behaviour in the Dictator Game
42Percentage bidding private value Average bid
Private value Non-students Students Non-students Students
4 28.6 26.7 4.8 3.7
6 46.2 30.8 5.1 4.9
8 18.8 61.5 5.6 7.7
10 18.2 31.8 7.4 7.7
Table 11: Behaviour in Auction
Non-students Students
Consistency rate 66.1% 68.3%
Average Switching Point 3.6 2.5
Table 12: Risk elicitation task
Non-students Students
Average Contribution (￿rst round) 55.5% 49%
Average Contribution (ten rounds) 41.2% 42.5%
Table 13: Behaviour in PGG
Game Students Non-students Mann-Whitney test of equality (p-value)
Dictator 100 98 .33
Trust Game 97 89 .10
Public Good 83 66 .02
Guessing 91 68 .09
Auction 92 73 .01
Table 14: Percentage who understand the instructions
43Appendix B: Instructions
Dear participants,
Welcome and thank you for participating to our experiment. The experiment will last
for about one and a half hour. Please do remain quiet from now on until the end of the
experiment. You will have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes.
The experiment consists of two main parts. Throughout the whole experiment, you will
receive instructions on the computer screen and be told what to do.
PART I In this ￿rst part, you will be asked to make choices in six di￿erent situations.
Each of these six is an entirely di￿erent and independent situation. You should treat
each as being independent of the others. We will describe each situation successively and
explain precisely what you have to do. In each situation your earnings will depend on your
choices, possibly the choices of others and chance. To make sure you understand what you
have to do, you will be asked to think of an example for each situation before you take
the actual decision. This is only to make sure you understood, and these examples have
no implications at all for your earnings. When each situation is over, there will be a very
short pause and then we will introduce the next situation. You will only be informed about
the outcomes of all six situations at the end of PART I. We will show you a screen with
the outcomes corresponding to each of the six situations.
The computer will then ‘roll a die’ to pick one of the six situations, which will determine
your actual earnings. That is, your actual earnings will depend on the choices you
made in one of the six situations only -this single situation will be selected at random
by the computer for all participants in this room.
PART II In this second part, you will be asked to answer questions and your earnings will
depend on your answers (your earnings in this part will depend only on your answers).
Again, you will be informed about the outcome of this part only at the end of PART
II.
We ask you to remain quiet during the whole experiment. Those who do not respect the
44silence requirement will be asked to leave the experimental room. Once the experiment is
￿nished, please remain seated. You will be called up successively by the number on your
table; you will then receive an envelope with your earnings and you will be asked to sign
a receipt.
Important note: The CESS lab has a strict ‘no deception’ policy. That means
that under no circumstances will participants to experiments be deceived. All the
information you will receive from us is true. For example, if we tell you that you have
been paired to another participant in the room, this is indeed the case. Finally, note that
your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to leave the room at any point
if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you the participation fee of ¿4.
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room. You
can take notes on these pages if you wish to do so.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
PART I
SITUATION 1
We have formed pairs of people at random in the room. Each pair is made up of person 1
and person 2. None of you will know with whom you have been paired. The experimenter
is the only one who knows who is paired with whom.
Person 1 will receive ¿10 and then can choose whether to transfer these ¿10 to person
2 or not to transfer any money and keep the ¿10.
￿ If person 1 decides to keep the ¿10, person 2 earns nothing.
￿ If person 1 decides to transfer the ¿10 to person 2, the money will be tripled by
us before it is passed on to person 2. That is, person 2 will receive ¿30.
Person 2 will be able to choose whether to transfer ¿15 back to person 1 or not to
transfer anything back in the event her/his account is credited with ¿30.
45￿ If person 2 transfers ¿15 back, both person 1 and person 2 will earn ¿15.
￿ If person 2 does not transfer ¿15 back, person 2 will earn ¿30 and person 1 will
earn nothing.
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome for this situation:
Decision of Person 1:
Decision of Person 2:
Earnings of Person 1: ¿
Earnings of Person 2: ¿
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
Please return to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen.
SITUATION 2
Each of you has to guess a number between 0 and 100. We will calculate the average of
the guesses of all participants in the room and multiply this number by two-thirds. The
person whose guess is closest to this number will receive ¿20 (in case of a tie, the computer
will select randomly one of the winners and he/she will receive ¿20).
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome for this situation:
Average of all guesses:
The winner would be the person with the guess closest to what number?
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
46Please return to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen.
SITUATION 3
You have been paired randomly with another person in the room. Each pair is made up of
person 1 and person 2. None of you will know with whom you have been paired. The
experimenter is the only one who knows who is paired with whom. Person 1 will receive
¿10 and will have the opportunity to give a portion of her (his) ¿10 to person 2. Person
1 can transfer any (round) amount between 0 and ¿10.
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome for this situation:
Decision Person 1: Transfer ¿to person 2
Earnings Person 1:
Earnings Person 2:
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
Please return to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen.
SITUATION 4
You will now have the opportunity to bid for an amount of money. There are 4 possible
amounts of money you could bid for: ¿4, ¿6, ¿8 or ¿10. The computer will determine
at random for each participant which of these four amounts you could bid for. This will
appear on the computer screen. Thus, some of the participants will be able to bid for ¿4,
some for ¿6, some for ¿8 and some for ¿10. All participants in this room bid in the same
auction.
You will be asked to introduce a bid. The person with the highest bid (among all partici-
pants in this room) will win the amount of money that has been allocated to that person.
Bids will remain private and will only be known to the experimenter.
47Important: The winner will have to pay the amount of money corresponding to the bid
of the second highest bidder.
Thus, if you are the highest bidder of the auction; you will earn the following: Your Prize
(¿4, ¿6, ¿8 or ¿10) - Second highest bid.
If you are not the highest bidder, you will not win or have to pay anything. In case of a
tie, the computer will select randomly one of the highest bidders and this will determine
who has won the auction.
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome for this situation, supposing there would only be 4 partici-
pants, who could win respectively ¿4, ¿6, ¿8 and ¿10
Bid submitted by person 1 (for ¿4):
Bid submitted by person 2 (for ¿6):
Bid submitted by person 3 (for ¿8):
Bid submitted by person 4 (for ¿10):
Who would be winning the auction? Person
Earnings of the person winning the auction: ¿(Prize) - ¿(Second highest prize) = ¿
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
Please return to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen
SITUATION 5
We will now propose eight di￿erent choices between a ￿xed amount of money and an all-
or-nothing lottery. The lottery will work as follows. The computer will roll a six-sided
die. The general rule is that you will earn nothing if the die indicates 1, 2 or 3; and earn
48something (as indicated for each case) if the die indicates 4, 5 or 6. Finally the computer
will pick at random a number between 1 and 8 to determine which of 8 cases applies to
determine your earnings in this situation.
You will be asked to indicate your preferred option in each of the cases.
For example:
Case 1: Choice between
A: ¿5 with certainty or B: ¿0 if the die shows 1, 2 or 3; ¿14 if the die shows 4, 5 or 6.
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome in this case:
Your choice (A or B):
Outcome of the lottery (die: 1,2,3,4,5 or 6):
Your earnings: ¿
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
Please return now to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen
SITUATION 6
We have formed groups of four people at random in the room. You have been assigned to
one of these groups. None of you will know who is in his/her group. The experimenter is
the only one who knows who is in which group.
Each member of the group has to decide on the division of 20 tokens. You can put these
20 tokens on your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project.
Each token you do not invest will automatically be transferred to your private account.
Your income from the private account: For each token you put on your private
49account, you will receive exactly one point. Nobody except you earns something from your
private account.
Your income from the project: We will add up the contributions made by the four
members of your group to the project. Each member will then receive an income from the
project calculated as follows:
Income from the project = Sum of all contributions of the members of the group x 0.4
Your total income
Your total income is the sum of your income from the private account and your income
from the project.
We will ask you to make such a decision 10 times in a row. We will add up the points you
have earned in each period and calculated your ￿nal earnings using the following exchange
rate: ¿1 = 25 points.
Note that your group will remain the same throughout this situation.
To make sure you understand the set-up, could you please provide an example (of your
choice) of a possible outcome for this situation:
Your contribution to the project: tokens
Sum of all contributions to the project (including yours): tokens
Your income from the private account: points
Your income from the project: points
Your total income: points
If you have any questions about the set-up, please raise your hand now and wait for the
experimenter to come to you.
Please return to the computer and follow the next instructions on the screen.
50PART II
We will now ask you 4 sets of multiple-choice questions. Each set has to be completed
within a certain amount of time. You can pass questions and come back to them later
within the same set. Once a set is completed, it is not possible to change or come back to
the answers you have submitted. You will earn 20p per good answer submitted.
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